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 Paradigm Shifts & Unintended Consequences:  The 
Death of the Specialist, the Rise of High Frequency 
Trading, & the Problem of Duty-Free Liquidity in 
Equity Markets 
Jennifer Victoria Christine Dean* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Every business day, hundreds of thousands of people turn on 
their televisions to watch CNBC.1  Millions more tune in to listen to 
Bloomberg radio.2  Thousands of men and women get home from 
work and open brokerage statements received in the day’s mail.  
These people have one thing in common: they want to know what is 
happening with the money.  The stock market is more than just a place 
where people buy and sell stocks; the health of the stock market 
(more specifically the health of the stock marketplace) is both an indi-
cator of, and a substantial factor in, the health of the worldwide econ-
omy.3  The stock market is more than just some abstraction on the 
news; it is to financial capitalism what the circulatory system is to the 
                                                                                                                           
 * Jennifer Victoria Christine Dean, J.D., Florida International University College of Law, 
2012; B.A., New York University, Gallatin School of Individualized Study, 2002; M.N.M., Florida 
Atlantic University, 2009.  I would very much like to thank the following people for supporting 
me, and for challenging me to be a better thinker and scholar.  Thank you to Professor Christyno 
Hayes, Dean Jose Gabilondo, Professor Jerry Markham, Professor David Walter, Scott Mcpart-
land—and most of all, my father. 
1 Brian Stelter, Market Ills Give CNBC a Bounce, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/15/business/media/market-gyrations-aid-cnbc-in-battle-for 
viewers.html?pagewanted=all. 
 2 Bloomberg Television Audience Is Cable's Wealthiest, New Mendelsohn Affluent Survey 
Reveals, PR NEWSWIRE (Oct. 28, 2004), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/bloomberg-
television-audience-is-cables-wealthiest-new-mendelsohn-affluent-survey-reveals-
72746037.html. 
 3 See Stock Market Performance, ECONOMYWATCH.COM (Nov. 23, 2010), 
http://www.economywatch.com/stock-markets-in-world/performance.html; see also Wen Mao & 
Michael S. Pagano, Specialists as Risk Managers: The Competition Between Intermediated and 
Non-intermediated Markets, 35 J. BANKING & FIN. 51, 51-52 (2011); Therese H. Maynard, What Is 
an "Exchange?"-Proprietary Electronic Securities Trading Systems and the Statutory Definition of 
an Exchange, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 833, 840 (1992) (“[t]he economic function of the trading 
markets is to create liquidity . . .”). 
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human body.  The stock market moves information. It moves money, 
and it allows people to take the pulse of the economy.   
For more than a hundred years, from the 1870s (when the first 
telephone was installed on the fabled “Floor” of the NYSE),4 to the 
beginning of the twenty-first century (when computers took over the 
vast majority of trading volume),5 a small group of specially qualified 
human beings helped control the flow of stock trading.  In doing so, 
they maintained the ability to protect both consumers and the econ-
omy at large from potentially dangerous swings in market volatility.6  
These men, who maintained market liquidity, guided the flow of 
trades, matched orders, and generally helped maintain a fair and or-
derly market, were members of a category of market participant 
called “market-makers.”7  At the New York Stock Exchange 
(“NYSE”), these stewards held the title “specialist.”8   
Today, NYSE specialists (and their counterparts at other ex-
changes) no longer exist.9  A perfect storm of regulatory and policy 
changes (which came to a head in the mid to late 1990s), combined 
with the advent of ever faster technology and structural market 
changes, led to the disappearance of exchange specialists.10   This arti-
cle is, in part, about the consequences of their disappearance.  It is also 
about the market liquidity function that exchange specialists once 
                                                                                                                           
 4 U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-CIT-469, ELECTRONIC BULLS AND 
BEARS: U.S. SECURITIES MARKETS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, 129 (1990) [hereinafter 
ELECTRONIC BULLS AND BEARS], available at http://www.fas.org/ota/reports/9015.pdf (acknowl-
edging that the first successful telephone call was placed by Alexander Graham Bell in 1876); 
THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE: THE FIRST 200 YEARS 49 (James E. Buck ed. 1992) (de-
scribing the NYSE’s pioneering use of the telephone). 
 5 See Tara Bhupathi, Technology's Latest Market Manipulator? High Frequency Trading: 
The Strategies, Tools, Risks, and Responses, 11 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 377, 381 (2010). 
 6 See generally Marios A. Panayides, Affirmative Obligations and Market-making with 
Inventory, 86 J. FIN. ECON. 513 (2007), available at http://www.pitt.edu/~mariosp/ 
AffirmativeObligations.pdf (“shed[ding] light on how exchange rules affect market-makers’ 
behavior and market quality”). 
 7 See Kumar Venkataraman & Andrew C. Waisburd, The Value of the Designated Market 
Maker, 42(3) J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 735, 735-36 (2007), available at 
http://kvenkataraman.cox.smu.edu/papers/VW.pdf. 
 8 Joel Hasbrouck & George Sofianos, The Trade of Market Makers: An Empirical Analysis 
of NYSE Specialists, 48 J. FIN. 1565, 1568 (1993); Peter Chapman, 2008 Review: NYSE Fights Back 
with Designated Market-Makers, TRADER'S MAG. (Dec. 2008), http://www. 
tradersmagazine.com/issues/20_289/102770-1.html (explaining that in 2008, in response to the 
changing structure of equity markets, the NYSE renamed the specialists “Designated Market-
makers” and moved their place of business from the floor of the NYSE to the upstairs offices). 
 9 See Chapman, supra note 8. In January 2010, “La Branche & Co., the largest Specialist 
firm in 2008, exited the business saying it would seek higher profits elsewhere.” Nina Mehta, SEC 
Questions Trading Crusade as Market-Makers Disappear, BLOOMBERG.COM (Sept. 13, 2010, 7:01 
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-13/sec-second-guesses-its-stock-trading-crusade-
as-u-s-market-makers-vanish.html. 
 10 See Chapman, supra note 8. 
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provided, and how current regulatory policy has left U.S. equity mar-
kets without enough obligated meaningful liquidity providers.   
Specialists were not perfect.  They certainly made mistakes, and 
history books are littered with occasions where they fell prey to hu-
man temptation, but the specialists had one valuable quality that 
computers do not have—they could be accountable.11   
For most of its history, the securities industry was necessarily self-
regulating.12  The market for equity trading in the United States first 
began in the early eighteenth century.13  However, because the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) was not created until 1934, 
for most of U.S. equity market history, the burden of regulating the 
securities industry fell to the institutions where trading took place—
institutions like the NYSE.14  Over time, the NYSE (and institutions 
like it) developed rules and regulations that governed the behavior of 
its members.15  There were rules and regulations governing most as-
pects of trading,16 but because of the central role that specialists played 
in the marketplace, particular attention was paid to the rules and regu-
lations governing their behavior.17  The rules that eventually emerged 
(rules addressing affirmative and negative obligations of the special-
ists, and the specialists’ obligation to ensure equity market liquidity) 
are a large part of the foundation of this article. 
                                                                                                                           
 11 See In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2007); see also George T. 
Simon & Kathryn M. Trkla, The Regulation of Specialists and Implications for the Future, 61 BUS. 
LAW. 217, 230 (2005); see generally SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF THE 
SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. DOC NO. 95, pt. 
2, at 61 (1963) (Report to House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce) [hereinafter 
“Special Study”] (The Special Study was a nearly 900 page document commissioned in response 
to suspected impropriety on the part of exchanges.). 
 12 See generally Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange As Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1457 
(1997) (explaining that at the time that the NYSE was created, the only real industry regulation 
came from the trading institutions.); see also Mark Borrelli, Market-Making in the Electronic Age, 
32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 815, 820 (2001) (“Historically the NYSE was considered the most prestigious 
and liquid market in existence. . .”).  As a result, from the second half of the nineteenth century 
to the 1930s [and the creation of the Securities and Exchanges Commission] the NYSE Byelaws 
were the most powerful and influential regulations in the world when it came to governing the 
behavior of equity market participants.  See also Ken Sweet, NYSE’s Grab at a $3.7 Quadrillion 
Market, CNNMONEY (Feb. 14, 2011, 2:26 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/02/14/ 
markets/nyse_banks/index.htm (noting that even after the creation of the SEC, the NYSE’s 
regulation department continued to act as the leader in the field). 
 13 1 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM 
CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS TO THE ROBBER BARRONS (1492-1900) 116-118 (2001) [hereinafter 
MARKHAM, COLUMBUS]. 
 14 See Simon & Trkla, supra note 11, at 246. 
 15 See Jerry W. Markham & Daniel J. Harty, For Whom the Bell Tolls: The Demise of Ex-
change Trading Floors and the Growth of ECNs, 33 J. CORP. L. 865, 885 (2008). 
 16 See id. at 881. 
 17 See Simon & Trkla, supra note 11, at 224. 
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The specialists and the exchange-based rules that governed their 
behavior (primarily affirmative and negative obligations) were regula-
tory tools that were used to protect the industry from the dangers of 
volatility and market illiquidity.18  By placing limitations and obliga-
tions on the actions of a few central players (namely, the specialists), 
the exchanges (and by proxy, the SEC) could ensure market liquidity 
in times of crisis, thereby decreasing volatility and helping to maintain 
a fair and orderly market—one of the SEC’s primary objectives.  Spe-
cialists were market-makers who stood ready, willing and obligated to 
buy or sell a stock when there was little or no open market demand 
for a given stock.19  These specialized market-makers were subject to 
strict rules and regulations; if a specialist did not fulfill his obligations, 
he got fired.20  Because the majority of equity trading volume was 
traded through the NYSE,21 and because there were a limited number 
of NYSE memberships available,22 there was sufficient market pres-
sure to ensure that the market as a whole was both subject to, and a 
beneficiary of the system.   
Over the course of two hundred years, the largely exchange-
based system for ensuring market liquidity adapted and grew as 
needed, but as the end of the twentieth century neared, new technol-
ogy (and corresponding regulatory and policy changes) shifted the 
mechanics of the marketplace in a way that would reach long and far.23  
With new technology at the ready and congressional policies that sup-
ported increased competition in place, a large percentage of equity 
trading volume migrated from exchanges to alternative trading sys-
tems.24  At roughly the same time (for different, but related reasons) 
                                                                                                                           
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. at 222. 
 20 See generally Amber Anand et al., Cleaning House: Stock Reassignments on the NYSE 
(Syracuse Univ. & Purdue Univ, Working Paper, 2007), available at http://www.cfs. 
purdue.edu/csr/research/Chakravarty-research/NYSE%20specialist%20reassignment.pdf (ex-
plaining the NYSE’s policy of reassigning stocks to other specialist firms). 
 21 DIV. OF MKT. REGULATION, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, MARKET 2000: AN 
EXAMINATION OF CURRENT EQUITY MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 8 (1994) [hereinafter MARKET 
2000], available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/market2000.pdf; ELECTRONIC BULLS 
AND BEARS, supra note 4, at 7 (indicating that as of 1990, the “NYSE [did] almost 95% of trad-
ing in exchange-listed stocks”). 
 22 See infra notes 70-81 and accompanying text; Press Release, New York Stock Exchange, 
New York Stock Exchange Ends Member Seat Sales Today (Dec. 30, 2004), available at 
http://www.nyse.com/press/1135856420824.html [hereinafter Press Release] (describing the evo-
lution of NYSE memberships). 
 23 See Borrelli, supra note 12, at 827. 
 24 See Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act Release No. 34–61358; 
75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3597 (Jan. 21, 2010) [hereinafter “Equity Market Structure Concept Release”] 
(requesting comments on the current state of equity market micro-structure); see ELECTRONIC 
BULLS AND BEARS, supra note 4, at 7 (While in 1990, the NYSE was responsible for executing 
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the specialists were forced out of business;25 and with the specialists 
out of business, the specialist-based system of liquidity provision dis-
appeared with them.  In its place, a new system for providing liquidity 
emerged—a system rooted in the ideals of the new paradigm of auto-
mated trading systems.   
The problem with this new system is that the old rules—the rules 
that once governed exchange-based trading—are no longer relevant.  
The old rules are inadequate to safeguard against the dangers associ-
ated with market illiquidity.  Consequently, the current state of the 
market is thus: high-frequency traders and other new market liquidity 
providers (who have taken the place formerly occupied by exchange 
specialists and their brethren) have no obligation to provide market 
liquidity.  The new system holds no one accountable. 
This transfer of power has left a regulatory gap in its wake.  The 
paradigm shift from exchange-based trading to alternative trading 
systems has created a loophole, which allows market participants to 
hold themselves out as market liquidity providers without any kind of 
accountability attaching to their actions.  This paper takes the point of 
view that high-frequency traders, and other market participants of 
size, who hold themselves out as market liquidity providers, should be 
subject to mandatory market-making obligations. 
This article begins with a snapshot of the current landscape of 
trading liquidity problems.  Next, a brief history of the rules and regu-
lations guiding and governing U.S. equity markets is presented—
followed by an explanation of market-making, market liquidity, and 
the evolution of the role of market liquidity providers.  The penulti-
mate section will discuss specialists, high-frequency traders, and the 
paradigm shift that led to the change in liquidity provision mecha-
nisms.  The article will finish by offering potential avenues of change 
that if implemented will help curtail the unintended and dangerous 
consequences created by changes in equity market structure present 
since the implementation of the national market system mandate. 
                                                                                                                           
ninety-five percent of the volume of nationally listed stocks, by October 2009, the NYSE handled 
just over 25% of its own listed stocks); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: 2011, 750 (2011) (see Table 1208. Transaction Activity in Equities, Options, and 
Security Futures, 1990 to 2009, and by Exchange, 2009), available at  
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2011/tables/11s1209.pdf (demonstrating that by 2009, 
the New York Stock Exchange handled just over 7 of the market for nationally traded stocks). 
 
25
 See Nina Mehta, SEC Questions Trading Crusade as Market-Makers Disappear, 
BLOOMBERG.COM (Sept. 13, 2010, 7:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-13/sec-
second-guesses-its-stock-trading-crusade-as-u-s-market-makers-vanish.html. 
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II. EQUITY MARKET LIQUIDITY: THE CURRENT STATE OF MARKET 
LIQUIDITY PROVIDERS 
The rise of electronic communication networks and high-
frequency trading has changed both the composition of the equity 
marketplace and the way that the marketplace functions.  The 1973 
congressionally mandated creation of a national market system, along 
with the chosen path of regulation for automated order matching sys-
tems, has had the unintended consequence of forcing stock exchanges 
(the longstanding first line of defense in consumer protection) into a 
supporting role.26   
As both trading volume and regulatory control have drifted away 
from the NYSE (and other exchanges), the reign of the specialist has 
ended.  In its place, a new type of market participant has emerged as 
victor.  This new reigning champion of Wall Street is the high-
frequency trader.27  During the last quarter of the twentieth century, 
various regulations and congressional actions (generally designed to 
help create more efficient markets through competition and transpar-
ency) came together and gave birth to a new breed of equity trading 
venue.28  These new venues (alternately referred to as alternative trad-
ing systems, automated trading systems, electronic communications 
networks, and proprietary trading systems), in turn, gave rise to high-
frequency trading.29  Computers have changed nearly every aspect of 
our world, and the stock market is certainly no exception.30  Where 
once upon a time stocks were traded in a physical marketplace and 
routed through brokers—human beings with a pulse—with the rise of 
alternative trading systems (and more specifically high-frequency 
trading), the trading volume that once flowed through the exchanges 
has been re-routed to these new order-matching venues.31  By some 
accounts, up to seventy percent of all equity trades are now executed 
through high-frequency trading programs.32    
                                                                                                                           
 26 See id. 
 27 Jonathan Spicer & Herbert Lash, Who's Afraid of High-frequency Trading?, THOMSON 
REUTERS (Dec. 2, 2009, 10:38 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/12/02/us-highfrequency-
idUSN173583920091202. 
 28 Liz Moyer & Emily Lambert, The New Masters of Wall Street, FORBES.COM (Sept. 2, 
2009, 6:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2009/0921/revolutionaries-stocks-getco-new-
masters-of-wall-street.html.  
 29 MICHAEL DURBIN, ALL ABOUT HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING 6-7 (2010). 
 30 See Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, From Markets to Venues: Securities Regula-
tion in an Evolving World, 58 STAN. L. REV. 563, 565 (2005); Thomas W. Malone et al., Electronic 
Markets and Electronic Hierarchies, 30 COMM. ACM 484 (2007). 
 31 Mehta, supra note 25. 
 32 Moyer & Lambert, supra note 28; DURBIN, supra note 29. 
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High-frequency trading is conducted at a blindingly fast pace.33  
Trades are executed in increasingly smaller fractions of a second.34  
Huge volume is transacted, and almost none of it is initiated by human 
beings—except insofar as a human being is needed to execute a run 
command for the computer’s trading algorithm.35  The emergence of 
the high-frequency trader is the direct result of the proliferation of 
alternative trading systems.  These hybrid trading systems are alterna-
tive venues for the purchase and sale of stock; they are venues that are 
by design, not classified as “exchanges” by the SEC.36  In order to be 
able to register with the SEC as a “national exchange,” a trading 
venue must meet extremely high standards, including the ability to 
self-regulate.37  The standards for participating in the equity market-
place as an alternative trading system do not include this require-
ment.38  As alternative-trading systems entered the market and began 
competing for (and successfully capturing) ever-larger percentages of 
the trading volume, a serious problem emerged. 
For most of trading history, human beings (acting in the role of 
market-makers) have served as market liquidity providers.  This is no 
longer the case.  As blindingly fast technology and computer algo-
rithms have acquired an increasingly large percentage of equity trad-
ing volume, the liquidity provision post that specialists once occupied, 
has been left vacant.  If this were where the story ended, it would be 
yet another sad tale of a class of workers being made obsolete by 
technology—but this is not where the story ends.  The NYSE special-
ists were not just men doing their jobs; they served a crucial function 
in the maintenance of a healthy financial marketplace.39  As the spe-
cialists were forced out of the business of market-making; they were 
resultantly also forced out of their role as the U.S. equity markets’ 
primary trading liquidity providers.  Their role as market liquidity 
                                                                                                                           
 33 Moyer & Lambert, supra note 28. 
 34 Equity Market Structure Concept Release, supra note 24, at 3595; see also Graham 
Bowley, The New Speed of Money, Reshaping Markets, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2011) (“Fear of this 
volatile, blindingly fast market may be why ordinary investors have been withdrawing money 
from domestic stock mutual funds“) 
 35 See Bhupathi, supra note 5, at 378 (explaining how high-frequency trading works and 
how it differs from traditional trading models). 
 36 Borrelli, supra note 12, at 854. 
 37 See id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78f (2006) (rules and regulations governing the creation of 
registered securities exchanges). 
 38 Borrelli, supra note 12, at 854. 
 39 See Hendrik Bessembinder et al., Why Designate Market-makers? Affirmative Obliga-
tions and Market Quality (Wayne State Univ. & Univ. of Utah, Working Paper, 2007), available at 
http://www.bnet.fordham.edu/yan/publications/Why%20Designate%20Market%20Makers.pdf 
(discussing the role and value of market-makers in finance); see infra section V on the economics 
of market-making. 
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providers was not voluntary.  Specialists were required to provide 
market liquidity in accordance with the NYSE Byelaws and SEC 
Rules and Regulations.40   
When the SEC was created, the rule regarding market-makers 
was fairly simple and straightforward; the SEC would not tell market-
makers how to make a market.41  The SEC simply required that ex-
changes choosing to use specialists disclose that usage to the SEC;42 
but because ninety-five percent of the volume went through the 
NYSE, the NYSE specialists were, as a result, the largest single group 
of market-makers in the industry.43  The NYSE specialists were, by de-
fault, responsible for providing trading liquidity to the equity market 
as a whole.44   
With the exchange-based specialists forced out by changes in 
monetary policy, high-frequency traders ostensibly filled the void and 
became the new (albeit unofficial) market-makers.45  High-frequency 
traders have become the new liquidity providers.  The problem with 
this new paradigm is that the high-frequency traders—who have taken 
over the incredibly important role of providing liquidity to one of the 
most important marketplaces in the world46—have no obligation to 
provide market liquidity.47  NYSE specialists and other exchange-
based market-makers ensured liquidity because they were subject to 
both SEC and exchange-imposed obligations.48  Because high-
frequency traders participate in the equity market through alternative 
trading systems instead of exchanges, they are under no such obliga-
tion.49  Voluntary market-makers can withdraw their capital from the 
                                                                                                                           
 40 See Simon & Trkla, supra note 11, at 273. 
 41 Id. at 250 (“Section 11(b) required exchanges choosing to have specialist systems to 
register their specialists, as Congress initially proposed.”). 
 42 Id. 
 43 MARKET 2000, supra note 21, at 8. 
 44 See generally Inside the NYSE: The Specialist, NYSE.COM, http://www.nyse. 
com/pdfs/specialistmagarticle.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2012) (informational release describing the 
duties of the NYSE specialists prior to their demise). 
 45 See Mehta, supra note 25.  
 46 See Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, Regulating Exchanges and Alternative Trad-
ing Systems: A Law and Economics Perspective, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 17, 17 (1999) (“C[apital] 
markets play an important role in America's economy.  Indeed, the role played by capital mar-
kets in the United States is more important than the role played by such markets in European or 
Asian countries . . .”). 
 47 Id. 
 48 See Mao & Pagano, supra note 3, at 51-52 
 49 See Adoption of Rule 11b-1 Under the Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release 
No. 34-7465, 29 Fed. Reg. 15862 (Nov. 26, 1964) (discussing how affirmative obligations were 
enforced through the self-regulatory components of the exchanges).  
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market whenever they choose to do so, and history has shown that 
when the market takes a downturn, they often do.50   
This new category of market participant—the high-frequency 
trader—claims to provide market liquidity and yet is not bound by the 
same rules and regulations that the specialists once were.  Because 
there are no SEC rules for how one must “make a market,” there is, at 
present, no way to fill the void that was left by the departure of the 
affirmatively obligated specialists.  This void must be filled.  The role 
of the specialist evolved over more than a hundred years.51  It evolved 
to meet the needs of the market, but now, that role has been all but 
obliterated, and the market needs that the specialists once filled are 
not being met.  Market liquidity is central to a healthy market.52  It 
dampens volatility, and it promotes consumer confidence.53  There are 
no longer enough active obligated market participants to ensure suffi-
cient market liquidity.54  Since the early 1990s, as the number of alter-
native trading systems has risen, so has the level of volatility in the 
stock market.55  This is not a coincidence.  The trading paradigm 
changed, and equity market regulation has not kept pace.   
If the SEC wants to protect long-term investors (both individual 
and institutional) from the inherent dangers in this new paradigm, 
then the SEC needs to refine the definition of a market-maker and 
adopt a system of market-wide affirmative obligations.  Taking this 
sort of action will make de facto markets (like high-frequency traders) 
into de jure market-makers.  This process should begin with a re-
                                                                                                                           
 50 See ELECTRONIC BULLS AND BEARS, supra note 4, at 60-61.   
For most of its history as a broker-dealer network, that is—before it registered as a national 
exchange in 2006— NASDAQ employed market-makers who voluntarily provided contra-
side liquidity.  During the 1987 stock market crash, one-third of the NASDAQ market-
makers withdrew from the market, thereby reducing liquidity even further and exacerbat-
ing the extreme volatility that was a part of the 1987 crash 
Id. 
 51 See Simon & Trkla, supra note 11, at 222; see generally id. (chronicalling the history of 
the evolution of the specialist function). 
 52 See generally Jose Gabilondo, Leveraged Liquidity: Bear Raids and Junk Loans in the 
New Credit Market, 34 J. CORP. L. 447, 448 (detailing the relationship between different types of 
liquidity in the financial context and why liquidity is vital to credit markets).  
 53 See infra Section IV. 
 54 See U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, 
FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010: REPORT OF THE STAFFS OF THE 
CFTC AND SEC TO THE JOINT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EMERGING REGULATORY ISSUES 4-5 
(2010) [hereinafter FLASH-CRASH REPORT], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
studies/2010/marketevents-report.pdf. 
 55 See Macey & O’Hara, supra note 46, at 46 (describing the constantly changing number 
of alternative trading systems and their proliferation); 20-Year Volatility Index for the S & P 500 
(VIX), http://finance.yahoo.com/echarts (search “VIX” in “get quote” field and set chart to 
“max” option). 
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evaluation of the extremely outdated definition of a market-maker 
and the implementation of market-wide affirmative obligations for 
those market participants who act as market-makers.  The new defini-
tion should include market participants with daily transactions above 
a certain intraday position threshold.  Furthermore, the SEC needs to 
impose uniform affirmative obligations on these newly re-defined 
market-makers regardless of any other potential monikers they may 
hold.  This will, in turn, level the playing field and create uniform stan-
dards for both official market-makers and de facto liquidity providers 
who hold themselves out as market-makers.  Unimpeded high-
frequency traders have taken the place of yesterday’s obligated ex-
change-based specialists, becoming today’s de facto market-makers.56  
High-frequency traders wield tremendous power solely because of the 
volume that they control.  Accordingly, these new players should be 
held accountable. 
III. CONTEXT: A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. A Brief History of Equity Markets in the United States  
In the United States, organized markets for the purchase and sale 
of securities began to appear at the end of the eighteenth century.57  
First in coffee houses, and later under the famed buttonwood tree, 
brokers and firms seeking to trade equity instruments began the proc-
ess of laying out rules and regulations designed to bind their trading 
activities and ensure accurate price-discovery.58  These first self-
regulating traders began the process of policing the early equity mar-
kets by adopting rules and regulations that would help ensure order 
and fairness.59  For example, one of these first rules was the concept of 
the fixed commission, which was implemented to promote civility and 
candor between trading members.60  These merchants and traders who 
conducted business within the walls of the Tontine coffee house would 
eventually become members of the New York Stock Exchange.61   
For the better part of the next hundred years, the only meaningful 
securities regulation came from the exchanges where trading oc-
                                                                                                                           
 56 See Mehta, supra note 25.  
 57 MARKHAM, COLUMBUS, supra note 13, at 116-118. 
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curred.62  The rules, regulations, and policies that governed the actions 
of market participants (like the rule regarding fixed commission 
schedules) were formulated by each exchange.63  These policies 
changed as the markets grew.64  As the nature and size of the capital 
markets grew, the exchanges adapted their policies in order to con-
tinue to maintain consumer confidence.65 
There were a number of regional exchanges in the nineteenth 
century, but when it came to best practices, the NYSE was the largest 
and the most influential.66  The NYSE, like many other exchanges, op-
erated an auction system.67  In the early years, the president would 
announce the stock and would then accept bids and offers.68  This auc-
tion system was the first organized marketplace for the sale of stocks 
and bonds in America, and it served an important price-discovery 
function.69  For most of its history, the NYSE was organized as a not-
for-profit trade organization.70  In order to participate in the auction, 
an individual71 would have to purchase a membership.72  Membership 
entitled the member to a “seat” at the auction.73  In the exchange’s first 
iteration, “seats” were actual chairs in the room where the auctions 
occurred.74  Eventually, the term “seat” became colloquial shorthand 
for an exchange membership.75  Only members could submit bids or 
offers, and members were not allowed to disclose the current prices to 
non-members.76  While these rules may, at first blush, appear elitist, 
they were not intended to be; rather they were intended to protect 
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 63 See Simon & Trkla, supra note 11, at 22-3. 
 64 MARKHAM, COLUMBUS, supra note 13, at 328. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Banner, supra note 58, at 119. 
 67 Id. 
 68 MARKHAM, COLUMBUS, supra note 13, at 123 (describing the move from a call auction 
system to a continuous auction system). 
 69 J. EDWARD MEEKER, THE WORK OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE 374-375 (The Ronald Press 
Co. 1930), available at http://books.google.com/books (search “the work of the stock exchange”); 
see also Markham & Harty, supra note 15, at 882 (discussing the role of the exchange); see infra 
Section IV. 
 70 See White Paper, NYSE, Governance of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. 5 (May 
2003), available at http:// www.nyse.com/pdfs/governancewhitepaper.pdf. 
 71 New York Stock Exchange, NYSE EURONEXT, http://www.nyx.com/en/history/timeline 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2011) [hereinafter NYSE EURONEXT] (noting how member firms were not 
allowed to incorporate until 1953). 
 72 MARKHAM, COLUMBUS, supra note 13, at 123 (The initial cost of a membership was 
twenty-five dollars). 
 73 MEEKER, supra note 69, at 39. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id.; see NYSE EURONEXT, supra note 71 (In 1868, memberships in the NYSE were 
deemed property rights which could be bought and sold). 
 76 MARKHAM, COLUMBUS, supra note 13, at 123. 
228 FIU Law Review [8:217 
market participants during a time when there was virtually no other 
form of regulation.77  The NYSE started with only a handful of mem-
bers, and eventually, in 1953, capped its membership number at 1366.78  
Memberships were initially owned by individuals and were non-
transferable; but eventually, memberships came to be bought and sold 
by individuals and firms alike, in a manner similar to that used to 
transfer and hold title to other intangible property interests.79  The cap 
on memberships created a barrier to entry for most—the all-time high 
selling price for a seat was $4,000,000.00 in 2005.80  Nevertheless, it also 
allowed the NYSE to maintain control of its practices, thereby creat-
ing a certain level of order in the market for its listed stocks.81   
As the economy grew throughout the nineteenth century, stock 
exchanges went from relatively localized entities that dealt primarily 
in local issuances to national centers for commerce.82  Rapid industri-
alization and expansive railroad construction created a need for a safe 
venue for raising capital in order to fund these enterprises.83  As the 
U.S. infrastructure grew (both economically and geographically), so 
did the market for securities.   
Although exchanges handled the majority of equity trading vol-
ume for most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, external trad-
ing has always existed.84  External trading is referred to as over-the-
counter (“OTC”) trading.85  In contrast to the exchange’s auction sys-
tem, historically, OTC trades were “negotiated” trades between indi-
viduals.86  One might call these transactions “private sales.”  Those in-
dividuals could be persons trading for their own purposes, or brokers 
that could not, or did not want to be a part of the exchange system.87  
Alternative trading systems (and electronic matching networks) are 
simply a technological advancement of the OTC market. 
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In a time when there was little to no government regulation, ex-
changes provided a sense of security.88  Exchange rules and regulations 
required vetting of companies and members.89  As the economy grew 
and the business of the exchanges boomed, the exchange listing stan-
dards became more stringent.90  As self-regulatory organizations 
(“SROs”), the NYSE and other exchanges developed sophisticated 
systems of governance and protocol.91  Even the U.S. government rec-
ognized the value in retaining an organic system that grew directly out 
of the needs of the community.92  By the time Congress passed the Ex-
change Acts, the NYSE had been in existence (in one form or an-
other) for more than a hundred years.93  Rather than start from 
scratch, Congress used the NYSE rules, regulations, and bye-laws as 
the foundation for the Exchange Acts.94 
B. An Overview of Relevant U.S. Equity Market Regulation and 
Legislation 
With very few exceptions, there were no securities laws prior to 
1911.  In 1911 (as a result of the 1907 panic) states began to adopt 
their own laws, but the era of meaningful securities regulation did not 
begin until 1933.95  The Securities Act of 1933 (the “1933 Act”) was 
passed in 1933.96  The Exchange Act of 1934, (the “1934 Act”), which 
created the Securities and Exchange Commission, was passed the fol-
lowing year.97  The Securities Act of 1933 and The Exchange Act of 
1934 (collectively referred to as the “Exchange Acts”), along with the 
self-regulatory functions of the exchanges, form the foundation of 
modern securities law and policy.  The specific events and economic 
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conditions that led to the first federal securities regulations are well 
beyond the scope of this article, but it is safe to say that the stock 
market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression precipitated the fed-
eral government’s involvement in the regulation of the securities mar-
kets.98  
The Exchange Acts were based on the concept of transparency.99  
Congress made it very clear that the intent of the legislation was to 
ensure that the potential investors had complete and truthful informa-
tion, and that any decision on the merits of the investment was to be 
left in the hands of the investor.100  The mission of the newly formed 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) was “to protect inves-
tors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital 
formation.”101  The SEC would not make evaluations as to the merit of 
a particular investment, as long as the consumer had sufficient access 
to information to make an informed decision.102  This is in keeping with 
the principal ideologies of capitalism. 
While the 1933 Act dealt primarily with issues surrounding stock 
issuances, the 1934 Act addressed the secondary market for equity 
instruments.103  The 1934 Act was predicated upon the idea that the 
vast majority of securities transactions between retail customers and 
broker-dealers were and would continue to be executed through na-
tional exchanges.104  The 1934 Act established required stock exchanges 
to register with the SEC as national securities exchanges.105  By making 
the exchanges accountable to the SEC, the government was also in 
effect making the companies that listed on the exchanges accountable.  
The 1934 Act endorsed self-regulation, subject to federal oversight.106  
Exchanges would continue to make their own rules and regulations, 
but new rules (and amendments to existing rules) had to be submitted 
for review and approved by the SEC before they could be enacted.107  
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By subjecting the exchanges’ self-regulatory power to SEC oversight, 
Congress created a strong incentive for the NYSE and other ex-
changes to continue to enforce market protection measures.108   
Although the 1934 Act was squarely aimed at regulating ex-
changes, trading that occurred outside of the exchanges (OTC trading) 
did not go unregulated for long.109  The 1938 Maloney Act was an 
amendment to the 1934 Act designed to target the OTC market.110.  
Like the 1934 Act, the Maloney Act was founded on the concept of 
self-regulation; however, the OTC market was unlike the exchanges in 
that the OTC market had no centralized organization ready to act in 
the capacity of self-regulator.111  In response to the Maloney Act, the 
National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) was created to 
act as a SRO for the OTC market.112  The broker-dealers who made up 
the NASD would eventually create NASDAQ, one of the first auto-
mated quoting systems.113  
In 1975, in response to a SEC study on the growth of institutional 
trading and technological innovation and inconsistencies in stock pric-
ing between venues, 114 Congress mandated the creation of a national 
market system.115  The idea behind the national market system was to 
create a new kind of securities market; one that would foster competi-
tion and provide fair access to quote information and trade execution 
through centralization.116  It was thought that this would, in turn, lead 
to market efficiency and liquidity.117  One of the first changes that oc-
curred as a result of the congressional mandate was the abolishment 
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of fixed commission schedules for brokerage trading.118  This change 
from a fixed commission schedule to a market bearing system was the 
first visible change in what would prove to be the largest shift in eq-
uity market structure in United States history.119   
The model for the national market rested upon the congressional 
vision that the majority of securities business would continue to be 
transacted through broker-dealers who would, in turn, complete those 
transactions through national exchanges.120  The national market sys-
tem concept would prove to be the driving force for SEC policy deci-
sions for the rest of the twentieth century.121  Although the national 
market system concept was, in part, based on the idea that the growth 
of new technologies would help facilitate price-discovery and market 
efficiency, two things that the SEC could not see in 1975 were the ex-
tent to which the growth of technology would increase exponentially 
in the last two decades of the twentieth century and the effects that 
such growth would have on the landscape of equity markets.122   
Regulation NMS (“Reg. NMS”) (the current legislative iteration 
of the “national market system”) is highly controversial123.   In its at-
tempt to create competition and to destroy the near monopoly that 
was the NYSE, Reg. NMS inadvertently destroyed the equity market’s 
ability to police itself.124  Because Exchanges are no longer in control 
of the lion’s share of equity trading volume, they no longer have the 
power to enforce policies and procedures essential to the health of the 
equity markets, including the vital market-liquidity provision. 
C. From Exchange to Venues: The Shift 
Until the technological advent of computers, the definition of an 
exchange was simple.  In much the same way that Justice Potter Stew-
art famously said of pornography: “I shall not today attempt further to 
define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that 
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shorthand description . . . but I know it when I see it.”125 Everyone 
knew what an exchange was, and what it was not.126 
Beginning with Instinet in 1969,127 followed by NASDAQ in 
1970,128 and then followed much later by the exchanges,129 equity mar-
ket participants began using computers to transmit information.  By 
1990, the definition of what was and was not an exchange was very 
much up for debate.130  In the years between 1969 and 1990, the SEC 
reacted to these new electronic venues by issuing “no action” letters.131  
In essence, each time the question of “whether a new venue was an 
exchange” would arise, the SEC would issue a letter releasing the elec-
tronic network from the obligations of registering as a national ex-
change (as defined by the 1934 Act).132  By 1990, it became clear that 
the problem would only continue to grow in size as technology be-
came more advanced.133  The SEC needed a more permanent solution. 
The SEC had a problem: they had a Congressional mandate to 
facilitate the creation of a national market system.134  These new elec-
tronic networks were, under the legislation then in effect, most easily 
classified as “exchanges,” but to classify these new entities as ex-
changes would likely stymie the growth of the national market system.  
It was, and still is, burdensome and extremely expensive to create a 
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nationally registered exchange.135  The amount of disclosure and prepa-
ration that goes into registering an entity as an exchange is substantial, 
in large part, because in order to register as a national exchange 
(which exchanges must do), one of the things that the organization 
had to prove to the SEC was that it had the means to carryout self-
regulatory functions.136 
The SEC’s answer to its newfound problem was the eventual in-
troduction of Regulation ATS (“Reg. ATS”); implemented in 1999.137  
Reg. ATS was designed to be a flexible regulatory mechanism that 
allowed alternative trading systems (sometimes called electronic 
communications networks or proprietary trading systems)138 to register 
as broker-dealers instead of exchanges.139  Reg. ATS created a com-
promise-category for systems that did more than traditional OTC 
broker-dealers, but not as much as traditional exchanges; systems that 
did not provide a “continuous” market.140  According to Reg. ATS an 
“alternative trading system” is a marketplace that:  
[B]rings together a buyer and a seller of a security in order to 
conduct activities commonly performed by a stock exchange, 
does not set out rules governing the conduct of those buyers and 
sellers (except as the conduct relates to trading activities), and 
does not discipline those buyers and sellers except by excluding 
them from trading.141   
Reg. ATS effectually allowed automated systems and computer 
programs to carry out the functions traditionally performed by ex-
changes.142  The enactment of Reg. ATS also meant that the paradigm 
of securities trade execution via human broker-dealers and exchanges 
was no longer the only way to trade.  Suddenly, because of the colli-
sion of new technology and favorable government policy, there was an 
entirely new way to participate in the business of buying and selling 
securities. 
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The push toward a national market system combined with Reg. 
ATS led to a proliferation of alternative trading systems.143  This, in 
turn, led to a drastic shift in the order flow of the equity markets.144  
The purpose of the national market system and Reg. ATS was to cre-
ate an environment that would allow for increased competition, and a 
fairer, more efficient market.145  To this end, Reg. NMS was fairly suc-
cessful; the rise of electronic markets increased competition and re-
duced transaction costs.146  The access to pricing data and trade execu-
tion certainly became more equal than it once was, but the explosion 
of venues also had unintended consequences— consequences that run 
contrary to the good intentions of the national market system man-
date.147  The move from traditional exchange-based trading to the more 
modern electronic trading platforms has left severe structural weak 
spots in the markets.   
From the beginning of U.S. equity market trading, until the ad-
vent of electronic trading, market liquidity was almost never an is-
sue.148 The existence of market liquidity was a given—an issue not re-
quiring attention.149  The way that equity markets were structured—
with order flow being routed primarily through exchanges—ensured 
that sufficient liquidity would almost always be available because the 
exchanges made sure of it.150  Through the long process of trial and 
error, the entities responsible for guiding the structure of the markets 
created a system that protected the values of U.S. equity market fair-
ness and safety.151  Then, almost overnight, everything changed.  Be-
tween 1999 and 2011, the mechanics of how equity instruments were 
traded changed totally and permanently.152   
                                                                                                                           
 143 See Moyer & Lambert, supra note 28. 
 144 See Mehta, supra note 25.  
 145 Macey & O’Hara, supra note 46, at n.3. 
 146 Recommendations Regarding Regulatory Responses to the Market Events of May 6, 
2010, Summary Report of the Joint CFTC-SEC Advisory Committee on Emerging Regulatory 
Issues, at *2 (Feb. 18, 2011), [hereinafter Feb 18, 2011 Panel Report], available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/jacreport_021811.pdf. 
 147 Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 7, 89 Stat. 97, 111-17 (1975). 
 148 See Borrelli, supra note 12, at 887 (discussing market fragmenting and the issues associ-
ated with the modern, contrary, paradigm). 
 149 Id. 
 150 See Bart Chilton, Commissioner, CFTC, Speech before the High Frequency Trading 
World, USA 2010 Conference, New York, NY: Speed (Dec. 8, 2010) (transcript available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opachilton-35). 
 151 See generally Simon & Trkla, supra note 11 (chronicalling the history of specialist and 
equity market regulation). 
 152 See Bhupathi, supra note 5.  
236 FIU Law Review [8:217 
Market volume migrated en masse from exchanges to alternative 
trading systems, which in turn led to market fragmentation.153  The new 
decentralized paradigm has rendered traditional liquidity provision 
systems impotent and ineffective.  The old design no longer works.  In 
the current non-centralized market system, liquidity is no longer guar-
anteed.154  In order to ensure liquidity in the current high-speed equity 
market structure, the SEC and other entities with the power to shape 
market structure need to take proactive, forward looking steps de-
signed to protect investors and provide structure for the new future.155  
IV. ENSURING LIQUIDITY: THE VALUE OF MANDATORY MARKET-
MAKING IN EQUITY MARKETS 
A. Volatility and Liquidity in Financial Markets: In General 
A centralized market creates liquidity; this is known in economic 
terms as “the network effect.”  Alternatively phrased, “Liquidity at-
tracts liquidity.”156  “As a single market attracts more and more trading 
volume in a stock, each new participant in that market enhances the 
value of the market to both existing and prospective participants by 
adding liquidity and thereby enabling that market to offer better 
prices.”157  This was one of the central ideas behind the original Con-
gressional mandate that the SEC create a national market system.158  
The other motivation was to create competition for the volume of 
stocks being traded.159  The thought was that competition would create 
better prices and lead to innovation.160 
Trading-liquidity (also known as market-liquidity) is vital to vir-
tually all financial markets.161  By way of an illustration, the Federal 
Reserve Board was created, in part, to ensure the liquidity of the U.S. 
banking system.162  After a series of panics and crashes, which culmi-
nated in 1907 when J.P. Morgan injected his own money into the U.S. 
banking system in order to prevent a meltdown, it became obvious to 
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government leaders that they needed a more permanent way to keep 
the money supply liquid.163    In the equity markets, market-makers 
(and specifically exchange specialists) have traditionally supplied li-
quidity.164 
B. Market-making and the Marketplace 
For almost two hundred years, the famed “Floor” of the New 
York Stock Exchange was the beating heart of financial capitalism.165  
In a time when the most advanced technology available to business-
men was the telephone, the Floor served as a centralized marketplace 
for the buying and selling of securities.  The Floor was more than just a 
place where stocks were bought and sold;166 it was a centralized mar-
ketplace that promoted the dissemination of information via the proc-
ess of dynamic price-discovery.167  The price of a stock went up and 
down hundreds or thousands of times a day, depending on a variety of 
factors such as supply and demand, the timing needs of buyers and 
sellers, and the quantity of a given stock.168 
In other modern marketplaces, such as venues for the distribution 
and trade of fungible goods, the price-discovery process is far less dy-
namic than it is in securities markets.169  In other markets, the process 
of price-discovery generally occurs over a longer period of time.  
Sometimes that period is a day or two; for example, a gas station that 
changes its prices daily.  Sometimes it is much longer.  Some markets, 
like the real estate market, can take months or even years to respond 
to the influences of supply and demand.170  The timing of price-
discovery in each type of market represents different aspects of the 
health of the broader economy, but the price-discovery process that 
occurs in marketplaces such as the Floor of the NYSE is arguably the 
clearest indicator of how the introduction of new market information 
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is being absorbed and processed by market participants.171  Each frac-
tional change in the price of a stock throughout the day is a response 
to what is going on in the world.  Each trade executed at a given price 
is a reflection of information being introduced into the economy.172 
In the twenty-first century, the function of the marketplace is of-
ten taken for granted.  This is likely because most market participants 
in first world countries never see the marketplace and its functions at 
work.  Marketplaces that were once housed in physical locations (such 
as town squares and local bazaars) are now largely virtual.173  The 
Floor of the NYSE is no longer the largest financial marketplace in 
the world.174  The NYSE and many other physical marketplaces have, 
for the most part, been relegated to the realm of history books.175  Re-
gardless of the fact that most marketplaces are no longer readily rec-
ognizable as such, it remains important to understand the function 
that the marketplace continues to serve.  Even though the price-
discovery function that marketplaces facilitate now takes place (pri-
marily) behind closed doors, it is important to remember that accurate 
price-discovery is still an essential component of healthy capital mar-
kets, and consistently accurate price-discovery requires a true market-
place, not just an automated order-routing system.176   
Regardless of how quickly it occurs, price-discovery is often facili-
tated by market-makers.  In the broadest sense of the word, market-
makers are market participants who act as third parties between a 
buyer and a seller.177  Market-makers stand as intermediaries who are 
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wiling to help maintain market-liquidity.178  A very basic example of a 
market participant who acts as a market-maker is a corner grocer.  He 
buys eggs and milk from the farmer in exchange for currency, and then 
the corner grocer turns around and sells the eggs and milk to the cus-
tomer down the street in exchange for more currency.  The price that 
he charges is influenced by supply and demand, timing, and the quan-
tity of the desired product that is available.  He generally makes some 
money on the difference between the price that he paid for the goods 
and the price that he sold the goods for.  This is part of his incentive to 
be a party to the transaction.  The corner grocer facilitates a transfer.  
If it were not for his willingness to buy and sell as an intermediary, 
costs would be much higher for both the farmer and the customer 
down the street.179  In short, the corner grocer’s existence allows for 
accurate price-discovery between the original seller (the farmer), and 
the buyer (the customer down the street); but perhaps most impor-
tantly, the corner grocer provides market-liquidity. 
During its heyday, the Floor of the NYSE was as much a market-
place as the corner grocery store is.  It offered the most visible exam-
ple of financial market-makers at work.180  When one looked at the 
action occurring on the Floor, most of the people milling about were 
floor brokers.   Floor brokers were members of the exchange who 
executed both buy and sell orders for the purchase or sale of stocks.181  
Most of those orders came into the Floor from outside representatives 
(usually registered broker-dealers), who had taken orders from end-
user customers.182 The other people on the Floor, the people who were 
tied to their stations (historically known as “booths”) were the spe-
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cialists.183  A specialist was also a member of the exchange, but a spe-
cialist had gone through additional vetting procedures and was subject 
to certain affirmative and negative obligations.184  As market-makers, 
the specialist stood ready to buy or sell when there was market illiq-
uidity.185  If a seller wanted to sell his stock, and there was no end 
buyer readily available, the specialist would purchase the stock and 
keep it in his own account.186  Once the order got to the specialist, the 
next step would depend on market conditions, but generally, the order 
would either be matched with a sell order from another floor broker, 
or the specialist would fill the order himself (if need be).187  In addition 
to providing contra-side liquidity, the specialist was charged with 
maintaining a “fair and orderly market[place]” and acting as agent for 
floor brokers who left unfulfilled orders with the specialist.188   
Specialists and other financial market-makers traditionally 
wielded great power; with that power came strict regulation—from 
both the exchange and the SEC.  As previously illustrated, the role of 
the market-maker is vitally important to the way that capital markets 
function.  Yet, as the mechanics of equity trading have changed, the 
specialists and other financial market-makers have been all but driven 
out of the markets that they once guided and controlled.189  In their 
place, a totally new category of market participant has risen. 
V. MARKET-MAKING & LIQUIDITY PROVIDERS IN U.S. EQUITY 
MARKETS: THEN AND NOW… 
A. Specialists as Market-Makers: The Historical Liquidity Providers 
In the context of equity markets, a market-maker is a broker-
dealer firm that “maintains a firm bid and offer price in a given secu-
rity by standing ready to buy or sell at publicly-quoted prices.”190  The 
fact that there is a broker-dealer standing ready to buy a stock (or sell 
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a stock) when there is very little contra-side liquidity for that stock 
promotes investor confidence and prevents panic.191  It also decreases 
pricing volatility by temporarily closing the gap between what a buyer 
is willing to pay and what a seller is willing to accept.192  In short, it cre-
ates market stability, which, in turn, instills investor confidence in the 
stock market.  It also (often times quite silently) creates confidence in 
the economy as a whole. 
As previously stated, the NYSE market-makers were known as 
specialists.193  In 1871, due to the increased trading volume, the NYSE 
went from an auction system in which the exchange auctioned off one 
stock at a time at periodic intervals during the day to a continuous 
two-sided auction system.194  In the continuous auction system each 
stock was assigned to a station and a specialist was assigned to each 
stock.195  From 1871 onward, bids and offers were placed with the spe-
cialist for that stock, and the specialist acted as a broker’s broker, an 
auctioneer, and a match-maker.196  If a broker had multiple orders 
from multiple clients at the same time, he could not treat all of the 
orders fairly because he could only be on one auction station at a time.  
The specialist system solved the broker’s problem of only being able 
to be in one place at one time.197   The specialist was created as an an-
swer to this problem.198 
Each specialist was by definition, a broker.199  Specialists had a 
book (known as a “limit order book” or simply “the book”) where 
they would record each bid and offer and act as the auctioneers, using 
a first-in, first-out approach to match bids with offers.200  Because these 
specialists had access to the book, they also had the ability to see both 
the relevant bid and offer at the same time.201  This so-called “time and 
place” advantage was seen as unfair, so in exchange for this benefit, 
specialists were assigned duties and obligations as a sort of quid pro 
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quo.202  The fact that specialists were also brokers created an obvious 
conflict of interest.203  The broker’s brokers were their own brokers.  In 
an attempt to curb potential abuses resulting from this conflict of in-
terest, in 1935 the SEC imposed a rule on exchanges that employed 
the use of specialists.204  This rule imposed “negative obligations” on 
the specialists.205  These negative obligations meant that the specialists 
were not allowed to trade for their own accounts in their specialty 
stock unless such a trade was “reasonably necessary” to maintain a 
fair and orderly marketplace.206  
In addition to the negative obligations placed on the specialists, 
as their role evolved, the NYSE and the SEC began to impose “af-
firmative obligations” on the specialists, eventually making the obliga-
tions mandatory in 1964.207  In exchange for the so called “time and 
place” benefits that the specialists enjoyed by being on the floor and 
having access to the book, the newly imposed affirmative obligations 
required specialists to commit their own capital to take the other side 
of a trade if there was no open market counter-party to the trade.208  
This affirmative obligation rule helped ensure a fair and orderly mar-
ket.209  By requiring specialists to act as buyers or sellers in times of 
market illiquidity, the SEC (through the NYSE) used specialists to 
ensure market liquidity; this liquidity created market stability during 
times of panic.210  If an arm’s length buyer (or seller) was not available 
for a given stock, the specialist would place himself in that role, 
thereby decreasing the level of volatility in the price of stocks and in 
the market as a whole.211  Alternatively put, specialists created a buffer 
zone in times of market panic.  By ensuring market liquidity, the panic 
that would inevitably ensue as the result of a market participant’s in-
ability to freely and easily move his stock was avoided.212 
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In 1964, in response to a nearly nine hundred-page study on po-
tential market manipulation, Congress amended the Exchange Act.213  
This study (hereinafter referred to as “the Special Study”) was com-
missioned, in part, because of concerns of abuses taking place in the 
equity markets, including but not limited to abuses perpetrated by 
exchange specialists.214  The Special Study remains, to date, one of the 
most comprehensive studies ever done on equity market structure.215 
The Special Study found that there were serious problems with the 
regulatory structure of the securities markets.216  The SEC found that 
many of the problems were due to their own lack of intervention and 
the industry’s inability to keep pace with the tremendous amount of 
growth that occurred in the preceding twenty-five years.217  The SEC 
was quick to note, however, that it was not the underlying regulatory 
structure that was lacking; rather, the structure simply needed en-
forcement and expansion, which would take into account the changed 
landscape.218  In essence, the SEC was admitting that it needed to do 
more.  This particular report and the regulatory changes that resulted 
are similar to the situation that exists today.  The SEC has the power 
to make changes, but thus far it is not using the power that it has taken 
responsibility for.219 
Specialists were not exclusive to the NYSE.  They existed in most 
exchanges although the specific form that their affirmative or negative 
obligations took was dependent on the rules and regulations of the 
exchange to which they belonged.220  It is worth noting here that al-
                                                                                                                           
 213 See generally Special Study, supra note 11. 
 214 Id.  
 215 Id. 
 216 Simon & Trkla, supra note 11, at 286. 
 217 Id. 
 218 Id. at n.447 (The Commission stated that the large number of companies going public, 
the “spectacular development of the over-the-counter market” and the increased participation of 
public investors “imposed strains on the regulatory system and revealed structural weak-
nesses.”). 
 219 Press Release, FINRA, NASD and NYSE Member Regulation Combine to Form the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority – FINRA, available at 
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2007/p036329 (“The Financial Industry Regula-
tory Authority (FINRA) today announced that it has commenced operations as the largest non-
governmental regulatory organization for securities brokers and dealers doing business in the 
United States. FINRA was created through the consolidation of NASD and the member regula-
tion, enforcement and arbitration operations of the New York Stock Exchange. The consolida-
tion, which was announced on Nov. 28, 2006 and approved by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission on July 26, 2007, became effective today, July 30, 2007.”). 
 220 Equity Market Structure Concept Release, supra note 24, at n.70 (“Affirmative and 
negative obligations generally are intended to promote market quality. Affirmative obligations 
might include a requirement to consistently display high quality, two-sided quotations that help 
dampen price moves, while negative obligations might include a restriction on ‘reaching across 
the market’ to execute against displayed quotations and thereby cause price moves.”).  
244 FIU Law Review [8:217 
though most exchanges had market-maker positions (like specialists), 
the fact that the NYSE was by far the largest exchange in the world 
for more than a hundred years makes it the most relevant example of 
market-making at work.  The Special Study was also the starting point 
for non-exchange based equity market-makers.221  The suggestions put 
forth in the Special Study lay the foundation for NASD market-
makers.222  The SEC was attempting to move the independent broker-
dealers of the NASD to a more exchange-like setup, but (foreshadow-
ing what was to come) unlike NYSE specialists, NASD market-makers 
were not “obligated” to provide contra-side liquidity—and this was a 
problem.223  NASD market-makers were also unlike NYSE specialists 
in that there was more than one market-maker for each stock in the 
OTC market.224  The NYSE had only one specialist per stock.225  Be-
cause there was competition between the NASD market-makers for 
each stock, and because prior to the advent of high frequency trading 
there was money to be made in voluntary market-making, NASD 
market-makers often provided contra-side liquidity because it was a 
good way to make money.226   
B. Why the Specialists Left the Floor 
Specialists made money through a commission system.227  This sys-
tem was profitable because the U.S. stock markets traded in eighths 
until 1997.228  Specialists made money by putting the difference be-
tween what they bought the stock for and what they sold it for in their 
pockets.229  On each trade, they stood to make at least an eighth of a 
dollar or, twelve and a half cents.230 When the stock market transi-
tioned from trading in eighths to trading in sixteenths, and then finally, 
to trading in pennies (often called “teenies”), there was no longer 
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enough of a margin for specialists to make money on their trades.231  
This push to change the trading denomination came from the SEC.232  
The specialists’ potential profit margin was essentially cut from twelve 
and a half cents to one cent (or less), thereby reducing their potential 
income by upwards of ninety percent.  In 2010, in light of the changing 
role of specialists and their ever-decreasing numbers, the NYSE 
changed the duties and renamed the specialists “Designated Market-
makers.”233   It was the death knell of a proud and vital industry that 
had kept the wheels of the economy turning for more than a hundred 
years. 
This change in monetary policy essentially put the specialists out 
of business.234  When they left the floor of the exchange, they took the 
liquidity function that they provided with them.235  Around this same 
time (and also as a product of the national market system mandate), 
there was a swell in the number of alternative trading systems.236  The 
market share that had once belonged to the NYSE was very quickly 
being divvied up between dozens of new alternative venues.237  The 
landscape of the equity markets changed almost overnight.238 
C. High Frequency Traders: 21st Century De Facto Market-Makers 
The SEC does not publicly support an official definition of high 
frequency trading.239  In practice, high frequency trading is exactly what 
it sounds like.240  Computer algorithms place large volume trades at a 
speed much too fast for human comprehension.241  The profitability of 
high frequency trading grew out of the regulatory and policy changes 
that Reg. ATS and Reg. NMS put in place.  Reg. ATS allowed alterna-
tive trading systems to register as broker-dealers instead of exchanges, 
thereby making it possible for more competitors to enter the market.242  
Reg. NMS (in its final iteration) required that market orders—orders 
designated to be executed at the current “market price”—be posted 
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electronically and be executed at the best available price nationwide.243  
This part of Reg. NMS was designed to create price transparency via 
centralization of information.244  For the most part, it served this func-
tion, but it also created a new and lucrative market for high frequency 
traders.245  Specialists were forced out of the market because they 
could no longer make money on the spread,246 but by executing an ex-
ceedingly large number of trades, high frequency traders could make a 
profit on even the smallest of margins.247  Also part of Reg. NMS was a 
shift in regulatory power.248  The SRO function that had rested with the 
NYSE and its equivalent exchanges was consolidated into a new 
quasi-governmental agency known as FINRA.249  This consolidation of 
power meant that the NYSE no longer had any real ability to self-
police.250 
High frequency traders do not just make money because of the 
tremendous volume of trades that they execute.  In addition to the 
profit margins that they collect for each trade, high frequency traders 
(like specialists before them) make money by accepting rebates from 
exchanges.251  These rebates are paid out to the high frequency traders 
in exchange for directing order flow toward the exchanges.252  High 
frequency traders also make money via the so-called “latency arbi-
trage.”253  These trades happen so fast that there is a latent period dur-
ing the time it takes the data to cross the electronic network.254  This 
time lag creates an opportunity for those with the fastest computers 
and those closest to the trading centers to profit off of any pricing 
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changes that occur in the milliseconds that it takes to transmit trading 
data.255 
In order to execute the kind of trades that high frequency traders 
participate in, they have to place a massive number of bids and of-
fers.256  Advocates of high frequency trading claim that high frequency 
trading injects liquidity into the markets.257  High frequency traders do 
provide liquidity to the markets, but they do not ensure liquidity in the 
markets.  This distinction is often ignored when proponents of high 
frequency trading discuss the benefit that it provides for the markets.  
High frequency traders have no obligation to remain in the markets in 
times of crisis.   
The role of high frequency trading in the future of equity markets 
is a hot button topic.  Proponents claim that high frequency trading is 
the way of the future.258  With everyone struggling to get a piece of the 
high speed pie (exchanges included), they may well be right.259  Those 
that are fundamentally opposed to high frequency trading as a way of 
doing business lament the destruction of equity markets at the hands 
of technology run amuck.260  Regardless of the position that one takes, 
it is undeniable that the rise of high frequency trading has raised a 
number of concerns.  Nowhere is this more clearly illustrated than by 
the SEC itself, in its January 2010 “Concept Release on Equity Market 
Structure.”261  In this particular concept release, one of the main issues 
that the SEC asked for comment on was high frequency trading.262   
By most estimates, high frequency trading now accounts for at 
least fifty percent of equity market volume (some estimates place the 
number as high as seventy percent).263  Given the primary role that this 
relatively new creature plays in post Reg. NMS equity markets, the 
SEC needs to evaluate and address how and to what extent high fre-
quency trading needs to be regulated.  First, how is high frequency 
trading to be defined?  There is no set definition for high frequency 
trading.264  The term “high frequency trading” encompasses everything 
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from algorithms put in place by companies like e-trade, to so-called 
“dark pools” of liquidity, internal proprietary trading done in-house 
within brokerage houses.265  Other concerns focus on the strategies 
used by high frequency traders.266  Is there a need for more regulation, 
or are the regulations already in place sufficient?  Is this a situation in 
which specific regulation is called for, or are the tools and strategies 
used by high frequency traders the bucket shops of the electronic age? 
The argument over high frequency trading and how it should be 
treated going forward is a very complex issue.  There are arguments 
that high frequency trading should be banned altogether.267  Some say 
high frequency trading runs contrary to the purpose of equity markets 
(capital formation).268  Others say that the tools used by high frequency 
traders manipulate the underlying fundamentals of equity markets.269  
The counter argument claims that high frequency trading enhances 
the marketplace for everyone by reducing the execution time on 
trades, narrowing price spreads (furthering the market wide goal of 
price-discovery), and providing liquidity.270   
For better or for worse, high frequency trading currently accounts 
for the majority of the transaction volume in today’s equity markets.271  
Because of their role as the “new” liquidity providers and the fact that 
they are, in effect, passive market-makers, high frequency traders and 
the regulation of their activities has been analogized to that of special-
ists.272  Some have suggested that because the role that the specialists 
once played is similar to the role that high frequency traders currently 
play, the high frequency traders should be subject to affirmative obli-
gations like their predecessors were.273   
There are two primary arguments set forth by those that advocate 
for mandatory affirmative obligations being imposed upon high fre-
quency traders.  The first argument is based on the theory that because 
high frequency traders have extremely powerful, highly sophisticated 
systems for order routing, execution, and cancellation, they have an 
advantage over other market participants.274  Proponents of this argu-
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ment claim that because trade execution in today’s market is highly 
automated, the highly complex, expensive systems that high frequency 
traders employ are akin to the time and place advantage that special-
ists once enjoyed.275   
The second argument set forth for the imposition of affirmative 
obligations on high frequency traders is also based on an analogy to 
the specialists’ time and place advantage.276  This argument is based on 
the theory that co-location gives high frequency traders a benefit not 
enjoyed by others in the market.277  Co-location is the term used to 
describe the benefit that trading centers enjoy by physically locating 
their servers close to trading centers.278  Co-location centers are used 
by the owner of the system and are also rented out to other systems.279  
In a market where milliseconds count, the value of real estate close to 
exchange centers is essential.280  For example, in Chicago, six square 
feet of rack space in the building where the Chicago exchanges house 
their servers can rent for $2,000.00 a month.281   
Both of these major arguments for the imposition of affirmative 
and negative obligations upon high frequency traders (due to the 
analogous relationship that high frequency traders share with special-
ists of the past), fail miserably.  The rationale is fallacious.  Advocates 
are looking for someone to blame for the current situation, and, while 
analogy is a wonderful tool (without which the law as we know it 
would not exist), in this particular case, to use analogous reasoning to 
draw connections between regulations of a past paradigm and a new 
one is quite simply an abysmally weak argument. This new paradigm is 
a long way from the origins of U.S. equity markets, and it needs to be 
evaluated as such. 
VI. AN ARGUMENT FOR MANDATORY OBLIGATIONS FOR TODAY’S 
“NEW MARKET-MAKERS” 
A. New Market, New Rules 
As the structure of the equity markets has changed, so has the 
role of regulators.  The Exchange Acts and the implementation of the 
national market system were both predicated upon the belief that the 
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majority of volume would continue to be circulated through ex-
changes.282  The exchanges were then, as now, subject to significant 
regulatory oversight.283  The rise of alternative trading systems (and 
high frequency trading in particular) has created a situation where the 
majority of the equity market volume is no longer being directly 
routed through exchanges.284  Equity market-making in the digital age 
has a gaping hole in its foundation—a hole large enough for a three-
ring circus. 
The SEC should impose affirmative obligations on market-
making high frequency traders but not because they share some tenu-
ous connection with the market-makers of the past.  The SEC should 
impose regulatory obligations on high frequency traders because, even 
by conservative estimates, high frequency trading accounts for more 
than fifty percent of the volume of trades executed in equity mar-
kets.285  These new liquidity providers can literally move markets, and 
with them, the global economy.286  Any market participant group that 
wields that much power over the heart of the world economy cannot 
be left unsupervised to guard the proverbial hen house.   
American equity markets lie at the heart of the economy.  During 
the initial exploration of the idea of a national market system, Con-
gress stated that securities markets are an “important national asset 
that must be preserved and strengthened.”287  Congress went on to say:  
National emergencies, which produce widespread unemployment 
and the dislocation of trade, transportation, and industry, and 
which burden interstate commerce and adversely affect the gen-
eral welfare, are precipitated, intensified, and prolonged by ma-
nipulation and sudden and unreasonable fluctuations of security 
prices and by excessive speculation on such exchanges and mar-
kets, and to meet such emergencies the Federal Government is 
put to such great expense as to burden the national credit.288 
Market-makers play an important role in providing liquidity to finan-
cial markets.289  There are a number of peer-reviewed studies support-
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ing the use of market-maker obligations in order to bolster market 
quality.290  The primary means of accomplishing this task is either by 
providing incentives or by imposing regulations (affirmative obliga-
tions) which lead to meaningful liquidity in times of crisis.291  Although 
there are focused marketplaces wherein incentive based market-
making is sufficient to provide necessary liquidity, the global equity 
market is not insulated enough to work solely on an incentive based 
system.292  The 1964 Special Study provides ample support for this the-
ory.293  The exchanges were initially forced to impose affirmative obli-
gations on their specialists because the specialists could not be trusted 
to refrain from taking advantage of their power without some kind of 
accountability.294  
High frequency traders do provide liquidity to the equity mar-
kets, but they do not ensure liquidity.  They are under no obligation to 
stay in the market.  In order for market-makers to have value to the 
market, they must be bound at least some of the time; they must be 
truly obligated.295  High frequency traders have no such obligation.  
The liquidity function that they claim to provide replaced a liquidity 
function that was provided by market participants who were subject 
to true obligations.296  High frequency traders provide liquidity. The 
problem with this statement as an argument against regulation is that 
although high frequency traders do provide liquidity, they also con-
sume liquidity.297  How they choose to interact with the market is based 
on algorithmic risk profiles that are continually re-assessed.298  So, 
while high frequency traders do inject liquidity into the markets at 
certain points throughout the trading day, whether they are liquidity 
providers or consumers depends on what time of day it is and the 
choices that their computer programs make.299   
Traditionally, because of their control of the majority of trading 
volume, ensuring liquidity and avoiding unnecessary volatility was the 
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province of exchanges.  This is no longer the case.  When a high fre-
quency trader’s computer senses uncertainty in the market, the pro-
gram automatically re-calibrates the trading parameters that it uses to 
determine whether to buy or sell a given stock and then executes its 
trades based on that new calibration.300  This recalibration can lead to a 
huge sell-off of stock.301  This stock dump then artificially depresses the 
price of the stock, which leads to even more pricing volatility.302  In the 
days of manual exchange-based trading, the specialist post was one of 
the primary tools that exchanges used to dampened volatility.303  Today, 
the specialists no longer wield the power that they once did.  
The other tool that exchanges relied on to dampen volatility was 
the “circuit breaker.”304  On May 6, 2011, the Down Jones Industrial 
Average (“The Dow”) lost and then regained more than 900 points in 
the course of just a few minutes.305  This event (hereinafter the “Flash-
Crash”) was the largest ever intraday loss on the Dow.306  The Flash-
Crash was the first large scale public display of the potential dangers 
that have come to exist since the trading volume shift from exchange 
based trading to high frequency trading.307  The massive pricing swing 
that occurred during the Flash-Crash activated the circuit breakers in 
place at the NYSE and other exchanges, but elsewhere, in the auto-
mated systems of high frequency traders, some of the algorithm based 
systems continued to push prices into the ground.308  Other high fre-
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quency trading systems simply withdrew their bids and offers from the 
marketplace.309  In years past, circuit breakers at the NYSE would have 
likely been enough to prevent the day’s losses (or at least greatly stem 
the hemorrhaging), but because the NYSE no longer maintains a ma-
jority market share, the NYSE’s own procedures for halting trading 
only impacted a small fraction of the overall markets.  This is not an 
argument in favor of the monopoly that was the NYSE; rather, it is an 
illustration of the dangers of a fragmented market without any one 
entity in control.  The SEC should in theory be that entity, but until 
the Commission starts acting with uniformity regarding safety proce-
dures, events like the Flash-Crash will likely continue.  
As a result of the Flash-Crash and subsequent findings, the SEC 
began to implement trading “pauses.”310  On June 10, 2010 the pauses 
were implemented on a provisional basis.311  Thus far the trading 
pauses have worked very well.  This is a prime example of the SEC’s 
successful implementation of a tool that was previously used only by 
exchanges, but it isn’t enough.  The SEC is further exploring how to 
improve the structure of the pause system so that it functions at the 
highest level of efficiency.312  In the interim, the Commission should 
take as many of the exchanges’ old systems as are still applicable and 
implement them. 
The SEC’s mission is “to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, 
and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”313  Putting aside 
the argument of whether the very concept of high frequency trading is 
at odds with the purpose of equity markets, or just the natural next 
step in an ever-evolving market, the plain fact is that based on size 
alone, high frequency traders have the potential to create extreme 
market volatility.  As exchanges lost market share, they also lost the 
ability to enforce the rules that they had developed.  As self-
regulatory organizations, the exchanges were the primary defenders of 
the capital markets.  Exchanges had market-makers (in the form of 
specialists) to ensure liquidity.314  As the volume shifted to high fre-
quency traders, the responsibility for ensuring liquidity and avoiding 
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dangerous volatility spikes, shifted directly to the SEC.315  The SEC’s 
recent adoption of trading pauses in all but the least active stocks, is a 
step toward the future, but if high frequency traders are here to stay, 
the SEC needs to make sure that they learn from the lessons learned 
from the history of the exchanges.  Incentives alone are not enough to 
protect U.S. equity markets from artificial volatility and liquidity cri-
ses.  This is not new information.  The reaction of the Nasdaq market-
makers during the 1987 crash put legislators on notice that incentives 
alone weren’t enough— that was twenty-five years ago 
B. Re-defining What it Means To Be a Market-maker:  Mandatory 
Uniform Affirmative Obligations for Market-makers 
In order to impose affirmative obligations on de facto liquidity 
providers, the SEC must begin by re-defining the term market-maker; 
focusing the new definition on which activities obligate a market par-
ticipant to act as a market-maker, and by laying out what a designa-
tion as a market-maker means for a market participant’s trading ac-
tions.  The current definition of a market-maker has not been updated 
since 1993.316  High frequency traders are today’s de facto liquidity 
providers.317  They are informal market-makers in a time when formal 
market-makers are no more.  Given this very real and current prob-
lem, the SEC needs to change the rules.  When high frequency traders 
act as market-makers they should be held accountable as such.   
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission, (“CFTC”) (in ac-
cordance with Dodd-Frank regulations) is in the process of enacting 
new “position limits.”318  In the CFTC context, position limits are:   
limits on the amounts of trading which may be done or positions 
which may be held by any person under contracts of sale of such 
commodity for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any 
contract market or derivatives transaction execution facility, or 
on an electronic trading facility with respect to a significant price-
discovery contract, as the Commission finds are necessary to di-
minish, eliminate, or prevent such [a] burden [on interstate com-
merce].319 
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The SEC could and should impose similar position limits for high 
frequency traders who participate in market-making activities.  The 
concern is not speculative profit making.  There have always been 
speculators in markets.320  Speculators are a vital part of market activi-
ties.321  Markets need people who are willing to take a risk that some-
thing will go up (or down) in value; it is fundamental to the economic 
principles of supply and demand.322  The true concern with the current 
equity market structure is that increased concentration of speculative 
activities creates danger to other market participants.  CFTC Commis-
sioner Chilton succinctly explained this difficulty in a December 2010 
speech to High Frequency Trading World: 
there is nothing whatsoever wrong with those speculators being 
in markets.  Bless them.  We need speculators.  Without them, 
there is no market.  The sheer size…of concentrated speculative 
interests has the potential of moving markets, of influencing true 
price-discovery.  That can make life difficult for the hedgers who 
use markets to manage commercial business risks, and for con-
sumers who rely upon them to fairly price just about everything 
they purchase.  Everything from a loaf of bread to a gallon of 
milk or gas to a home mortgage is impacted by these markets.323 
The main purpose of the creation of a national market system 
was to facilitate competition and free market principles.324  This new 
concentration of activity violates the national market system idea.  
Furthermore, under the pre-NMS paradigm, the existing centralized 
market system had protections in place.  Now the equity markets are 
faced with a similar centralization of activity, but without any of the 
rigorous rules and restrictions that existed under the NYSE/Nasdaq 
duopoly. 
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The SEC needs to examine and re-define what the term market-
maker means in the context of equity market participation.  According 
to the SEC definition, the term market-maker means  
any specialist permitted to act as a dealer, any dealer acting in 
the capacity of block positioner, and any dealer who, with respect 
to a security, holds himself out (by entering quotations in an in-
ter-dealer communications system or otherwise) as being willing 
to buy and sell such security for his own account on a regular or 
continuous basis.325   
This definition is extremely outdated.  It was written at a time 
when specialists were the predominant market-makers.326  The defini-
tion of a market-maker should be updated to include any trader who: 
provides the appearance of liquidity to the market because of the vol-
ume of trades transacted; or who holds himself out as willing to buy 
and sell a security for his own account on a regular or continuous ba-
sis. 
The age of the specialist as a meaningful liquidity provider is 
over.327  The SEC needs to recognize that the entities that currently 
hold themselves out as market-makers are no more obligated to make 
markets than any ordinary broker would be.  High frequency traders 
have all of the benefits without any real responsibility or accountabil-
ity.  As previously recommended one possible way to remedy this 
problematic situation is to impose intraday position limits on high 
frequency traders acting as de facto market-makers.  Traders who sur-
pass the position limitations would be required to register as market-
makers.  In turn, registered market-makers would be required to act as 
obligated market-makers by providing contra-side liquidity during 
specified times.328  A regulation of this sort would help to ensure liquid-
ity during times of crisis by forcing the market participants who trans-
act the most volume to remain accountable to the market that they 
utilize regardless of whether the participant is an exchange-based 
trader, a broker-dealer, or a high-frequency trader.  By basing the 
definition of a market-maker on the volume of the entity’s trading 
activities, the SEC will not have to constantly reevaluate the defini-
tions of each different kind of market participant.  Furthermore, the 
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problem of defining, and maintaining a definition of, “high frequency 
trading” would disappear.  Creating a framework that focuses on mar-
ket activities tied to obligations seals off the loopholes inherent in an 
entity-definition based system.  If Congress went further and added 
rules and regulations delineating how legal business relationships be-
tween affiliated organizations should be managed, for purposes of 
calculating whether an entity has reached its intra-day position limit, 
another loophole would be closed. 
High Frequency trading also presents the problem of increased 
message traffic and market surveillance costs.329  This, too, is an area 
where the individuals producing the most amount of market noise 
should be held accountable.  It is not fair to make the market as a 
whole pay for what is in essence, a tool in the arsenal of the high fre-
quency trader.  One of the strategies that high frequency traders use is 
the rapid placing and cancelling of orders in the marketplace.330  This 
practice, similar if not analogous to the old “flash trades”331 of the open 
outcry system, has created some of the aforementioned “market noise 
costs.”  High volume, high frequency traders who create informational 
waste should shoulder the responsibility of paying for the costs associ-
ated with that waste.  They should also be subject to contra-side li-
quidity obligations when the volume of their trades exceeds a certain 
threshold.  These instantly cancelled bids and offers have the very real 
potential to create an illusion of liquidity.  Because this type of liquid-
ity could be considered “false liquidity,” high frequency traders who 
conduct significant amounts of this type of trading should be required 
to ensure the existence of the liquidity that they claim to provide.332  
By requiring market participants that exceed designated volume 
thresholds to shoulder the related informational costs, the SEC would 
create an incentive for high frequency traders to build their algo-
rithmic programs around completed stock purchases, which would 
help deter trading programs that are built around false liquidity.333 
Affirmative obligations can take a number of forms, but the most 
common affirmative obligation is the requirement that a market-
maker maintain a “fair and orderly market” by using the funds in his 
account to ease temporary imbalances in the supply or demand of a 
given stock, thereby increasing liquidity and decreasing volatility.334  
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Part and parcel with this requirement that market-makers provide 
contra-side liquidity are the guidelines for how a market-maker 
should go about the business of making a market.  Thus far the SEC 
has never imposed regulations that specify how a market-maker has 
to go about fulfilling his trading duties.335  When the SEC first ad-
dressed the issue of market-makers, it drafted a simple regulation be-
cause the primary regulatory body in U.S. equity market then was the 
NYSE’s SRO branch.336  The SEC did not need to get involved with 
how the exchanges and venues made markets because for the most 
part, there was nothing for them to comment or improve upon.  The 
SEC allowed each individual exchange to set up specific rules that 
governed the limitations and requirements for their specialists.337  The 
SEC only required that exchanges which chose to employ specialists 
had to inform the SEC.338 
Now that the days of exchange-specialists-as-market-makers are 
essentially over, and the SRO responsibilities that once belonged to 
the exchanges now belong to the SEC (carried out through the quasi-
governmental subsidiary, FINRA), the SEC needs to change its level 
of involvement with market-makers and market-making activities.  In 
light of the shift from exchange traded volume to high frequency 
traded volume, created by automated systems, the SEC needs to re-
address how market-makers make markets.  Exactly how to imple-
ment such a system is a topic that will undoubtedly require further 
investigation; however, the primary issues to consider are: how much 
volume a given venue produces and how many unique stocks the 
venue trades.  In short, the SEC needs to establish a regulatory infra-
structure for a marketplace that is now dominated by automated trad-
ing.  
C. Incentives for Willing Participants  
In addition to imposing mandatory contra-side liquidity obliga-
tions on market participants who transact average daily volumes in 
excess of the previously suggested position limitations, there are in-
centive based reasons why a market participant might want to volun-
tarily take on market-maker obligations.339  The SEC has entertained 
implementing various programs and policy changes designed to entice 
high frequency traders to voluntarily take on the role left vacant by 
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the mass exodus of specialists.  Some of these proposals include: 
changes to the structure of the maker/taker trading model,340 peak load 
pricing strategies,341 an expansion of information dissemination that 
would pave the way for high frequency traders to take advantage of 
the vast computing resources at their fingertips,342 differential pricing,343 
and preferential co-location provisions.344 
The goal of nearly all of these policy initiatives is to create a mar-
ket structure wherein market participants in general and high fre-
quency traders in particular, are able to take advantage of the infor-
mation available as a result of the introduction of super computers.  In 
much the same way that specialists once maintained a special advan-
tage and corresponding obligations because of their location on the 
floor, the SEC should now seek to create an analogous system for the 
modern world.  It was after all, the intent of the original NMS man-
date to create a more transparent and accessible equity marketplace.345  
This optional incentive based system is an effective part of a much 
needed larger reform plan—a plan with the end goal of ensuring that 
the most active of traders being given the least amount of flexibility in 
their market choices, because those traders literally have the ability to 
move markets.  While incentive based programs and policy changes 
are insufficient to protect the economy from market participants who 
can independently move markets, the value of these programs should 
not to be overlooked.  Incentive based programs are a great way to 
entice middle volume traders into the market as accountable trading 
participants.346   
The question of how to protect the American economy from the 
rapid changes that have occurred in the structure of equity markets 
during the last twenty years is an infinitely complex problem.  It 
should be addressed in descending order of importance.  The partici-
pants that pose the most danger must be dealt with first and must be 
regulated most stringently.  It is for these reasons that the entities with 
the most power should be subject to official mandatory obligations.  A 
more flexible system can be imposed on parties that are not as power-
ful as their more active counterparts.  It should also be noted that a 
system which has come apart practically overnight, due to the ever-
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increasing rate of change to the underlying structural systems, must be 
re-built on a platform of flexibility to allow for future changes.  To lose 
sight of that lesson would be to make a mockery of the people who 
once dedicated their careers, and in some cases their lives, to ensuring 
this country’s financial stability. 
There seems to be consensus at the SEC that some combination 
of incentives and regulations are required in order to provide a stable 
and liquid market moving forward.347  Assuming the SEC begins ad-
dressing the issue by focusing on the market participants with the 
most power, this appears to be a valid approach to solving some of the 
problems facing twenty-first century equity market structure. 
D. Moving in the Right Direction 
The SEC has already started to re-examine equity market struc-
ture and high frequency trading.348  The May 6, 2010, Flash-Crash was a 
very real example of the clash between the old and the new world or-
ders, and what can happen when technology moves faster than regula-
tion in vital marketplaces.349  As a result of the Flash-Crash, the SEC 
implemented new rules for market-makers that essentially banned the 
use of “placeholder” bids and offers.350  These placeholders, commonly 
referred to as stub-quotes,351 were once upon a time, a way for market-
makers to nominally comply with their quoting obligations.352  In the 
present market, stub-quotes have little value.  The parties that necessi-
tated the existence of stub-quotes have long since left the floor, but to 
leave stub-quotes as a part of the infrastructure is equivalent to leav-
ing power-tools at an abandoned construction site.353  It is foolish and 
unnecessary.  The SEC has also put circuit breakers in place in order 
to pause trading in situations when the computer algorithms that run 
high frequency trading systems react to erroneous market changes 
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before human beings can intervene.354  These are both steps in the right 
direction, but they are not enough.  The naked concentration of power 
that has gathered around high frequency traders must be regulated.  
To fail to regulate entities that can literally move markets, to the det-
riment of both institutional investors and farmers alike, is to fail the 
people that the Exchange Acts were created to protect. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The role served by traditional market-makers was all but abol-
ished by Regulations ATS and NMS.  High frequency traders have 
replaced the liquidity function once provided by market-making spe-
cialists.  High frequency traders claim to provide liquidity in the mar-
ket.  In practice, they only provide liquidity when the algorithms that 
they employ determine that the risk reward ratio is tipped in their 
favor.  They have no obligation to continue to provide liquidity during 
periods of economic turmoil, as exchange-based specialists once did.  
Specialists were given a right to trade in a certain way because they 
also agreed to take on the duty of standing ready to take the other 
side of the trade when there was a lack of liquidity.  When that prom-
ise failed to protect the markets, the SEC intervened and imposed 
mandatory affirmative obligations on exchanges choosing to employ 
specialists.  High frequency traders now maintain a similar benefit 
without the obligation.   
The equity market is one of the core pillars of the global econ-
omy.  The national market system was designed to help the equity 
markets, not harm them.  Market quality should not suffer because of 
technology and increased competition; market quality should be im-
proved by the introduction of these elements.  For market-quality to 
be harmed by advancement is contrary to the entire objective of the 
national market system.  Competition is good but not at the expense 
of the quality and integrity of the equity market system. 
Some argue that the cost of requiring high frequency traders to 
comply with quote obligations is not fair to the traders, but assuming 
that protections limiting the losses of quote obligators are in place for 
unexpected market events, the burden for those with the highest level 
of market participation is minimal.  High frequency traders make 
huge sums of money from extremely short-term transactions.  The 
SEC has made it clear that when the interests of long-term investors 
and the interests of short-term traders’ conflict, the interests of the 
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long-term investor should prevail.355  In this situation, the cost to the 
short-term trader is less important than protecting the interests of the 
long-term investor. 
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